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ABSTRACT 
EU involvement in healthcare policies is growing, despite the fact that national governments 
prefer to keep an almost exclusive say in these policies. This article explains how this shift of 
authority could happen and explores whether it will lead to a European healthcare union. It 
argues that federalism offers the most fruitful way to do so because of its sensitivity to the EU’s 
institutional settings and to the territorial dimension of politics. The division of competences 
and national diversity of healthcare systems have been major obstacles for the formation of a 
healthcare union. However, the EU obtained a role in healthcare through the impact of non-
healthcare legislation, voluntary co-operation, court rulings, governments’ joint-decision traps, 
and fiscal stress of member states. The emerging European healthcare union is a system of 
cooperative federalism without much cost-sharing. The healthcare union’s robustness is 
limited, also because it does not generate much loyalty towards the EU. 
KEYWORDS: (European integration; federalism; healthcare; joint-decision trap; patients’ rights 
directive) 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1952, the French minister of health, Paul Ribeyre, proposed establishing a European Health 
Community similar to the European Coal and Steel Community (Parsons 2003: 86ff). He 
specified in a draft treaty of 330 articles how supranational institutions should regulate health 
policies. Ribeyre’s proposal failed to receive support from European governments, including his 
own, and from powerful interest groups. For many years, health policies remained an exclusive 
national competence in Europe, and to this day, national governments within the European 
Union (EU) prefer to keep an almost exclusive say in healthcare policies, which entails 
organising, financing, and providing diagnoses, cares and cures to people who are ill. A sizeable 
majority of EU citizens also prefer national decision-making on healthcare over joint decision-
making by national governments and the EU (European Commission 2010). This view is 
reflected in Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: “[t]he Union 
should respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their health policy 
and for the organization and delivery of health services and medical care”. Nevertheless, EU 
involvement in health policies has expanded, in terms of both scope and depth. With the 
Maastricht Treaty (in force since 1993), the supranational European Union (EU) obtained a say 
in public health, which includes all policy measures to increase the physical and mental well-
being of all people (such as anti-pollution policies). Today, the scope of EU health policies 
includes access to healthcare and the quality and safety of healthcare goods and services. The 
EU thus influences even the core of member states’ healthcare policies: the delivery of services 
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to patients. Moreover, the depth of EU involvement ranges from sharing information and 
voluntary standardisation of norms to enforcing EU laws (Vollaard et al. 2013). 
The growing EU involvement in healthcare policies leads to the two key questions of this 
article. First, how could this shift of authority to the EU level happen despite the reluctance, if 
not opposition, from national governments and their citizens? Second, where will this shift lead 
to, a European healthcare union similar to the Area of Justice, Freedom and Security or the 
European Higher Education Area? The rise of a “new compound European healthcare state” has 
already been observed (Lamping 2005: 43), but it has remained unclear what shape it will take. 
We argue that federalism offers the most fruitful way to explain the trajectory and nature of EU 
involvement in healthcare policies because of its sensitivity to the specific institutional settings 
of multilevel polities and to the territorial dimension of politics. Comparative studies of 
federalism have shown the causal mechanisms behind the territorial allocation of authority on 
welfare policies in multilevel systems such as those of Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the 
EU (Obinger et al. 2005a, 2005b). These mechanisms indicate how member states’ objections 
against EU involvement in welfare policies can be circumvented while the territorial interests of 
the member states continue to leave their mark on welfare policies. After introducing 
federalism in more detail, this article uses this perspective to show how EU involvement in 
healthcare policies has been unlikely but has taken place nonetheless. The article subsequently 
defines the nature of the European healthcare union in the making and reflects upon its 
political sustainability with the help of the various federalist arrangements that are 
distinguished in multilevel polities.  
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The added value of this article is not only to analyse EU involvement in healthcare from 
a single political science perspective (see, for a holistic analysis from a legal perspective, Hervey 
and McHale [2015] and, for overviews of EU health policies including healthcare, Greer [2009] 
and Mossialos et al. [2010]) but also to empirically demonstrate the utility of federalism for 
explaining task allocation in the EU (Benson and Jordan 2008).  
 
THE EXPLANATORY VALUE OF FEDERALISM 
Defining a European healthcare union 
Before discussing the explanatory value of federalism, it should be clear what a European 
healthcare union is. The first two words of this concept are relatively easy to define: European 
refers here to the European Union and its predecessors, and healthcare concerns the 
organisation, financing, and provision of diagnosis, care, and cure to ill people. This definition 
also includes the means of diagnosis, care, and cure, such as pharmaceuticals. Defining union is 
more difficult because the term rather vaguely refers to a commonality that makes a certain 
collection of units a distinct entity, and this commonality may be of varying nature. With 
respect to a healthcare union, it could refer to the common use by professionals, patients or 
other actors of the units’ healthcare systems, the common values and standards that guide 
these healthcare systems, the union’s common institutions for healthcare policy-making, or a 
common regulation or financing of (parts of) the healthcare systems. A healthcare union could 
thus vary not only in nature but also in strength from less to more and weaker to stronger 
commonalities. 
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Problematic explanations of European healthcare integration 
Analyses of the evolution of EU involvement in public health and healthcare policies have often 
highlighted its patchy nature, which resulted from the combination of the impact of European 
market legislation, responses to health crises and threats, such as cancer, AIDS and BSE, and the 
diffusion of information and standards through European health policy networks (Hervey and 
Vanhercke [2010]; Lamping and Steffen [2009]). The European Commission and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) are often cited as the most influential actors through their 
provision of the infrastructure for European health policy networks and application of EU 
market legislation to health policies, respectively. In this article, we move beyond these policy-
specific explanations, which allows us to become better aware of and explain the peculiar 
dynamics of EU involvement in healthcare.  
Intergovernmentalism, one of the classical general theories of European integration, 
considers the preferences of national governments, in particular the most powerful member 
states, as decisive for EU involvement in any policy area. However, this is a problematic 
explanation for the emergence of a healthcare union because of the consistent and widespread 
opposition to EU involvement in healthcare among national governments. Additionally, the 
CJEU, the Commission and other non-state actors have also pushed EU involvement forward 
beyond national preferences concerning healthcare.  
According to neo-functionalism, another classical perspective on integration, functional 
interdependencies exert integrative pressures from one policy area or issue to another. Non-
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state actors, such as interest groups and European institutions, are perceived to be 
instrumental in this spill-over process. Indeed, studies show the importance of legislation on 
issues related to healthcare and the supranational entrepreneurship of the European 
Commission, judicial policy-making by the CJEU and European networks of experts and activists 
as driving forces of European integration of health policies (Lamping [2005]; Martinsen [2005]; 
Trubek et al. [2009]). Neo-functionalism thus indicates potential actors and sources that could 
circumvent governments’ aversion towards healthcare integration (Greer 2006). However, the 
neo-functionalist expectation that actors who benefit from European integration would shift 
their loyalties towards the new European decision-making centre has been empirically refuted 
(Risse 2005). Additionally, it remains unclear under what conditions functional 
interdependencies would lead to integration. For example, the case of the UK shows that 
disintegration, also with respect to healthcare, can occur despite dense and tight functional 
connections among its regions. Additionally, strong economic interdependencies and an 
abundance of market-making integration have not resulted in a full-fledged market-correcting, 
nationwide welfare regime in the USA (Streeck 1995). Thus, despite functional 
interdependencies, the EU market should not be expected to quasi-automatically increase EU 
involvement in healthcare, and as such, neo-functionalism is also a problematic explanation of 
an emerging European healthcare union. 
 
Fruitful federalism 
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 After a period of relative oblivion, the classical perspective of federalism has been increasingly 
used to empirically analyse the EU (Benson and Jordan, 2008). As a political structure, 
federalism is essentially about a combination of self-rule and shared rule (Elazar 1987). 
Whereas only few expect the EU to develop into a federal state, it has sufficient in common 
with multilevel systems such as the USA, Germany and Canada to explain task allocation with 
the help of federalism. The commonalities concern the division of rule between the central and 
the sub-units’ levels of governance, the autonomy of each level of governance in at least some 
tasks in their respective territories, formal arrangements to change the division of rule, and the 
representation of the sub-units at the central level (Börzel and Hosli [2003: 186-187]; Kelemen 
[2003: 185]; Obinger et al. [2005a: 9]). These commonalities thus relate to both the institutional 
set-up of a political system and the territorial dimension of politics. From the perspective of 
federalism, the governments of member states are not assumed to be the only decisive actors 
(as in intergovernmentalism) or to be reactive to the activities of non-state actors (as in neo-
functionalism). Instead, federalism can encompass an active role of both governments and non-
state actors in its explanation of European integration (Benson and Jordan 2011).Furthermore, 
federalism underlines the significance of the exact decision-making procedure, and it sheds 
light on how the interplay between functional and territorial politics leaves its mark on policy 
developments. Federalism as a theory of task allocation thus offers a more comprehensive 
understanding of the trajectory of policy integration than the theories discussed above. 
An additional advantage of federalism is that it provides analytical tools for describing 
the nature of a healthcare union. In the scholarly literature, three types of federalism have 
been discerned: dual (strict division of rule between the levels of governance), joint-decision or 
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cooperative (shared rule between the levels), and shared-cost (funding from one to another 
level) (Banting [2005]; Börzel and Hosli [2003]). Whereas dual federalism emphasises the 
institutional autonomy of the two levels of governance, cooperative federalism concerns a 
system under which policy competences are shared. In shared-cost federalism, the central level 
provides sub-units with financial means if both levels agree on the conditions. Each model of 
federalism has its particular balance of representing territorial (sub-unit) and functional 
(central) interests (Börzel and Hosli [2003: 184]; Egeberg [2001]). The USA most closely 
resembled dual federalism once, but it shifted towards shared-cost federalism, and Germany 
combines cooperative with shared-cost federalism. In general, the EU has been characterised as 
an instance of cooperative federalism (Benson and Jordan 2011). With only a limited budget to 
share with the member states, it relies largely on regulation as the means of rule. In a system of 
cooperative federalism, integration and policy outcomes are the result of neither central, 
supranational actors nor national, sub-unit actors exclusively. Yes, the CJEU can adjudicate in 
important issues, the European Commission has the right to propose legislation and to enforce 
its implementation, and the political groups in the European Parliament co-decide on EU 
legislation. However, the member states’ governments still represent territorial interests at the 
central level through their participation in the Council of Ministers. The latter’s legislative 
centrality implies a certain asymmetry in political representation whereby territorial interests 
still tend to dominate over functional ones (Börzel and Hosli [2003: 190]). Additionally, national 
courts mediate the application of CJEU rulings. Additionally, national courts mediate the 
application of CJEU rulings. EU policy outcomes are thus conditioned by the institutional 
structures through which territorial interests are continuously voiced. In particular, where EU 
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decision-making depends on the (nearly) unanimous agreement of the member states, so-
called joint-decision traps hinder optimal solutions to policy problems (Scharpf 1988, 2011). 
When one or some of the member states can easily veto a decision, decision-making results in 
the lowest common denominator or the status quo. 
Federalist explanations of task allocation in the process of European integration still 
need further theoretical refinement and empirical testing (Benson and Jordan 2011). Given the 
commonalities among federative systems, the method of comparative federalism allows us to 
distinguish the causal mechanisms behind the reallocation of (welfare) policies. A number of 
comparative studies indicate that federalist arrangements inhibit the emergence of welfare 
schemes (see Obinger et al. 2005a). Free mobility and a lack of federal transfers in a multilevel 
polity could prevent individual member states from establishing welfare schemes that would 
otherwise be overburdened by needy citizens from elsewhere. If member states do establish 
welfare schemes, mutual diversity hampers their integration into a larger scheme. Misfits in 
terms of organisation and policy ideas between the proposed and existing welfare schemes, 
diverging preferences, vested interests and members’ veto powers are likely to be 
insurmountable obstacles in this respect. However, as Obinger et al. (2005a, 2005b) observe, 
the inhibitive impact of federalism on the development of welfare schemes is contingent upon 
a series of conditions. Federal authorities can also have the institutional rights or budgetary 
means to expand their roles in welfare policies, constitutional courts could be willing to accept 
an expansive central say in welfare policies, and political parties and interest groups might push 
for an expansive central role in welfare policies. The exact institutional arrangements and the 
representation of functional and territorial interests determine whether and how the federal 
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centre could obtain tasks in welfare policies. From comparative federalist studies, causal 
mechanisms can thus be derived to explain whether and how authority on welfare policies is 
reallocated from lower to higher levels of governance. The following sections discuss why the 
emergence of an EU healthcare union could occur, even though it has been rather unlikely. 
 
THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF A EUROPEAN HEALTHCARE UNION 
No central jurisdiction and national policy pre-emption 
Studies of comparative federalism and welfare state development indicate manifold factors 
that would make EU involvement in healthcare policies rather unlikely. A simple but crucial 
factor is the division of rule. After the failure of the quickly forgotten proposal by Ribeyre, 
healthcare did not feature in the Treaties of Rome (in force in 1958). The treaty on the 
European Economic Community (EEC) focused on the internal market and external trade, 
leaving social protection to the member states. Without any explicit jurisdiction, the central 
level was not expected to interfere in the healthcare systems within the member states 
(Martinsen and Falkner 2011). The introduction of a European framework for authorising 
pharmaceuticals in 1965 in the aftermath of the thalidomide tragedy was the proverbial 
exception in this respect. The fairly strict division of rule, an instance of dual federalism, 
enabled member states to develop their healthcare systems without much European 
involvement (cf. Obinger et al. [2005a: 45]; Obinger et al. [2005b: 550]). Through this pre-
emptive occupation of the healthcare policy area by the national governments, the relatively 
young nationwide healthcare systems could become firmly entrenched within the member 
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states. Only when national governments felt that the EU’s centre might interfere too much in 
healthcare policies because of an expanding EU role in public health did they explicitly set down 
their healthcare prerogatives in European primary law through the Amsterdam Treaty (in force 
in 1999). Governments’ desire to maintain national sovereignty in organising and financing their 
healthcare systems has lived on, as illustrated by a collective statement from the German, 
Portuguese and Slovenian governments: “[w]e are determined to maintain the national 
competencies for healthcare organization” (Notes of the Trio Presidency 2007). The pre-
emption of the healthcare policy area by national governments and their continuing adherence 
to the principle of subsidiarity with respect to healthcare have thus limited the possibilities to 
put healthcare firmly on the European policy agenda (Princen 2009: Ch.6).  
 
National diversity and the joint-decision trap with a default option 
After WWII, a wide variety of healthcare systems emerged within the member states. A 
distinction is often made between tax-financed, universal, state-led national health service 
systems and social insurance systems financed by premium contributions, with various 
arrangements depending on occupation, region, ideology or religion and run foremost by 
private health providers and health insurance funds (often in close cooperation with social 
partners) within a public law framework. This distinction is based on the founding period of 
healthcare systems (until the 1970s). Most social insurance systems now also have universal 
coverage, and many national health service systems have given more space for private 
healthcare providers. However, diversity still abounds because of the introduction of new 
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governance arrangements, such as competition and patient choice in a number of systems, and 
the various EU enlargement rounds that expanded the variety of systems.  
As the history of federalism and welfare state development shows, diverse, entrenched 
systems are difficult to integrate into a larger union because of the ensuing vested interests, 
organisational differences and diversity of preferences as well as territorially fragmented 
interest groups (Obinger et al. 2005a, 2005b). If the EU had been an authoritarian system, as 
multilevel Germany was in its early days, these obstacles to unification could have been 
overcome (Obinger et al. 2005b), and this also holds if the EU could have obtained (exclusive) 
jurisdiction on healthcare. However, treaties that would enshrine EU competence in healthcare 
have to be negotiated by the member states’ governments and ratified by their domestic 
constituencies, and this is rather unlikely to happen given these governments’ resistance to EU 
interference in healthcare. Even where the EU could adopt secondary European laws 
(regulations and directives) related to health(care) policies, doing so often required the 
approval of (nearly) all national governments in the Council of the EU until the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty (in force since 2009), at least on non-market issues. Approval is also rather 
difficult given the diversity of the healthcare systems involved. Typical for systems of 
cooperative federalism, the EU thus faces a joint-decision trap whereby (near) unanimity is 
required to make decisions (Scharpf 1988). The EU also relies heavily on the member states to 
implement EU primary, secondary and case law. The incentive to adopt or implement EU law is 
rather limited given that the default option of not deciding—which results in less European 
interference in their healthcare systems—is closer to member states’ preferences. The 
14 
 
combination of diversity and a joint-decision trap constitutes a significant obstacle for forming a 
European healthcare union. 
The EU centre lacks many other means to expand its involvement  
EU interference in healthcare has not only been constrained by its limited jurisdiction and the 
veto power of the collective of member states. It also lacks means that other centres in federal 
systems have used to expand their role in welfare policies. For example, supranational 
involvement in healthcare could be increased through financial support. Canada provides an 
informative example in this regard; its federal government has enhanced its role in healthcare 
by providing grants to the provinces in exchange for a larger say in their healthcare policies 
(Banting 1995, 2005). Lacking an autonomous tax base and a sizeable budget, EU authorities 
are constrained in expanding their influence in this way (Obinger et al. 2005b: 565). Shared-cost 
federalism in healthcare policies in the EU thus remains an unlikely future. 
Powerful interest groups and political parties can be another driving force behind 
expanding the centre’s role in welfare policies. For example, Christian democratic and social 
democratic parties pushed for central welfare arrangements despite territorial divisions in 
Austria and Germany. However, EU authorities cannot rely on political parties and interest 
groups that are sufficiently powerful and willing to overcome the diversity of healthcare 
arrangements across the EU. A call for unifying European healthcare policies is barely heard. 
Most political parties honour the preferences of their citizens to keep healthcare by and large a 
national competence (Martinsen and Falkner 2011). Since the CJEU provided patients with 
more opportunities to obtain cross-border healthcare, “there is essentially no evidence of 
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economic, political, or social supporting coalitions” to facilitate the ensuing implementation 
(Greer 2011: 191). Interest group support for patient mobility legislation remains limited (Greer 
and Rauscher 2011: 235). The limited societal support may not come as a surprise given that 
the interests of patient movements, health provider associations, and health insurers are 
foremost vested in national healthcare systems.   
Comparative studies have shown that resistance can also be overcome by shifting to an 
arena that comprises actors who are more willing to support central welfare policies. For 
example, Austria and Germany have relied on the para-fiscal and para-statal execution of the 
centre’s social security by employer federations and trade unions (Obinger et al. 2005b: 565). 
Again, this is scarcely an option for healthcare in the EU. The European Commission facilitates a 
variety of platforms for stakeholders to discuss health matters at the EU level and to set up a 
framework for creating cross-border reference networks for highly specialised healthcare, but 
the direct execution of European healthcare policies by third parties, such as health providers, 
remains difficult if not impossible because of the member states’ competences and 
involvement in organising and financing healthcare. 
 
 
ESCAPE ROUTES TOWARDS A EUROPEAN HEALTHCARE UNION 
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Making a European healthcare union in the multilevel EU appears to face insurmountable 
hurdles. Nevertheless, comparisons with the making of welfare regimes in other multilevel 
entities show the possible escape routes towards some sort of European healthcare union.  
 
European legislation’s indirect impact on healthcare 
In Switzerland, federal authorities could begin to strengthen their say in social policies by 
regulatory, non-redistributive legislation on related issues. Similarly, without many financial and 
administrative sources, EU authorities have few other powerful means for expanding their 
influence in healthcare policies except for legislation on which the European Commission holds 
the right of initiative (Obinger et al. 2005b: 565-566). Because policy areas are difficult to keep 
completely separated, the European Commission thus has a means to expand its say in 
healthcare indirectly. Given the focus of the 1958 EEC Treaty, European legislation that is 
relevant to healthcare foremost relates to the free movement of goods, services, workers and 
capital (Hervey and Vanhercke 2010). Since 1958, European regulations have coordinated the 
access to public healthcare systems for employees who work elsewhere in the EEC/EU. By now, 
these so-called coordination regulations include everyone in public healthcare (insurance) 
systems, covering almost all legal residents of the EU. An accompanying European Health 
Insurance Card was launched to facilitate obtaining emergency care abroad (Vollaard 2006), 
and to facilitate the free movement of workers, European legislation on the mutual recognition 
of diplomas set minimum standards regarding the education and training of health 
professionals who seek registration elsewhere in the EU. Moreover, the Internal Market 
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Information System (IMI) assists member states in exchanging information about health 
professionals’ right to practice. 
The free movement of goods has entailed legislation to guarantee the safety and quality 
of pharmaceuticals, blood, human tissue, human organs and medical devices in the internal 
market as well as to make transparent national pricing and reimbursement rules of medicines 
(Lamping and Steffen 2009). The creation of a level playing field in the internal market also 
brought about standards on health and safety at work, including working time. Legislation on 
the free movement of services has yet to face exemptions for (private) health insurances that 
are part of any social security system, but it does show how market legislation is increasingly 
limiting the options for national governments to organise, finance and provide healthcare 
(Thomson and Mossialos 2010). Rather than the EU respecting national competences on 
healthcare, national governments should respect EU legislation on fair competition (without 
trade-disturbing state subsidies to health providers or health insurers) and access to healthcare 
markets without hindering free movement or discriminating under the conditions laid out by EU 
authorities.  
Previously, unanimous decision-making also allowed individual governments to block 
market legislation for its undesired impact on their healthcare systems. However, unanimous 
voting on market legislation has been gradually replaced by qualified-majority voting to avoid 
the joint-decision trap, in particular with respect to market issues. As a result, individual 
governments have less opportunity to prevent market legislation with (unintended or 
unwanted) impact on healthcare, which contributes to the growing EU involvement in 
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healthcare. European integration also involves a policy area that is closely interlinked with 
healthcare. Building upon a number of voluntary initiatives to fight ‘new’ diseases, such as AIDS 
and cancer, the EU obtained a legal basis for a complementary role regarding public health in 
the 1990s (McKee et al. 2010). It includes the guarantee of high-level health protection in all 
policies and activities and support for member states to coordinate their disease prevention, 
food safety and health promotion efforts (including tobacco control and the fight against drugs 
abuse). Gradually, healthcare has also become part of the mutual exchange of information and 
EU-funded research in efforts, for instance, to learn about the financial and health performance 
of healthcare systems in the face of demographic and technological developments (Hervey and 
Vanhercke 2010). Nevertheless, the relative lack of expertise and legislative powers, as well as 
financial and administrative capacities, constrains the European Commission from including 
health considerations in all European policies, and questions remain regarding the extent to 
which findings from EU-funded research are used in national policies (McKee et al. 2010). 
 
Court rulings with national governments caught in a joint-decision trap 
In multilevel systems such as Australia’s, court rulings have been a major impetus for social 
policy initiatives (Obinger et al. 2005: 566). This also holds for the EU with respect to 
healthcare, partly because of the EU’s decision-making procedures. The European market 
challenges the territorially closed national healthcare systems, which were initially sheltered 
from cross-border competition and the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital. 
Although cross-border health consumption and provision are still limited (Glinos et al. 2012), 
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litigation has entailed a considerable contribution of CJEU case law in health matters. European 
legislation resulting from compromises between governments, the European Commission and, 
more recently, the European Parliament is often somewhat ambiguous. The laws provide 
leeway in the CJEU’s interpretation, which the court has used in cases concerning healthcare 
(Martinsen and Falkner 2011: 132). However, member states can change European legislation 
to roll back undesired interpretations by the CJEU. For example, when the CJEU stated in the 
late 1970s that a patient could seek any effective healthcare treatment abroad if it would not 
be available in his or her home country, the ten member states decided to indicate more clearly 
that only treatments that are part of a patient’s healthcare package can be subject to 
reimbursement for cross-border healthcare under the Coordination Regulations (Martinsen 
2005: 1038). This exemplifies the importance of territorial politics, where the territorial 
interests represented by member states in the Council result in legislative corrections to court 
decisions regarding maintaining the principle of state territoriality in healthcare. 
However, the diversity among a growing number of member states makes it increasingly 
difficult to roll back undesired CJEU case law. The joint-decision trap in healthcare policies thus 
functions as an obstacle not only to EU involvement in healthcare but also to revoking case law 
concerning healthcare. A major example is the process after the outcry of all national 
governments against applying market legislation to healthcare services in a series of court cases 
that began in 1998 and that allowed reimbursement for cross-border healthcare services and 
goods without prior authorisation, albeit under certain conditions. Governments called for 
excluding healthcare from the interference of the EU, or at least its market legislation, to 
restore the principle of state territoriality but could not fully counter the case law because of 
20 
 
disagreements about the desired procedure (Martinsen and Falkner 2011: 134). Because the 
Court based its verdicts directly on the free movement principles laid down in the treaties, they 
could only be rolled back by changing these fundamental treaty parts, which proved impossible. 
Additionally, some governments initially refused to discuss healthcare at the EU level at all but 
eventually accepted that—albeit foremost informally—health politicians should shape EU 
involvement in healthcare rather than courts (Hervey and Vanhercke 2010).  
The failure of national governments to collectively counter the CJEU case law offered 
the European Commission the opportunity to keep the issue of cross-border healthcare on the 
agenda, and it did so by launching studies and discussion platforms, scrutinising member states’ 
compliance with case law and codifying case law in EU legislation. The European Parliament, 
which had obtained a co-legislative role in EU decision-making, also called upon EU rules to 
limit legal uncertainty for patients. A first legislative attempt by the European Commission in 
2004 to include healthcare in the Services Directive with severe restrictions on prior 
authorisation met with unbeatable opposition from national governments, the European 
Parliament and many interest groups. In response to the pressures of the internal market, the 
health ministers agreed on a set of common values and principles that emphasised the non-
economic tenets of the EU health systems, such as quality, safety, evidence-based ethical care, 
patient involvement, redress, privacy, and confidentiality (Council conclusions 2006). A second 
attempt by the European Commission followed in 2008 with the “directive on the application of 
patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare” after extensive consultations with governments and 
interest groups. The European Parliament and the Council eventually agreed in 2011 on a 
substantially changed directive that enshrines the right to reimbursement for cross-border care 
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provided by providers both within and outside of public health (insurance) systems under 
certain conditions. It requires member states to facilitate access to cross-border healthcare 
(with the exclusion of long-term care, organ transplantation and vaccination programs) by 
providing information to (future) patients on prior authorisation, reimbursement levels, quality 
and prices of healthcare and redress mechanisms, inter alia by National Contact Points. The 
directive also includes agreements on voluntary cooperation on issues such as reference 
networks, in particular for treating rare diseases, health technology assessment, and e-health. 
In the protracted negotiations on the directive, prior authorisation regarding obtaining 
healthcare abroad was a fundamental issue in both the Council and the European Parliament. 
The final version of the directive states that authorisation can be applied not only for hospital 
care but also for highly specialised and cost-intensive care. Furthermore, member states define 
what ‘highly specialised and cost-intensive care’ is rather than the Commission, which it had 
originally proposed. Member states can also deny access to cross-border healthcare if there are 
concerns about the quality and safety of care of a specific health provider or if the care could 
pose a threat to a patient’s safety or public health. Additionally, the directive explicates that 
member states can refuse to treat foreign patients for reasons of general interest under certain 
conditions. Thus, member states keep more territorial control over which type of healthcare 
could circulate freely than expected according to many interpretations of the CJEU case law and 
the Commission’s proposal. The patients’ rights directive also emphasises that member states 
are only obliged to reimburse up to what the same type of healthcare would cost back home. In 
this way, the financial impact of the directive is minimised and the possibilities for patients to 
use more expansive healthcare facilities elsewhere in the EU is limited. Member states also 
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prevented the expansionary role the European Commission had foreseen for itself with respect 
to developing quality of care standards (Baeten and Palm 2012). In sum, despite the member 
states’ incapacity to roll back CJEU case law entirely by means of primary law, they managed to 
insert more territorial control into secondary legislation than was originally indicated by the 
Commission and case law. This modification of the case law and a legislative text allowing more 
space for territorial politics facilitated the conclusion of a final compromise but ultimately 
confirmed an increasing EU role in healthcare. The trajectory of healthcare policies has thus not 
been simply a product of supranational steering by court and commission but has been shaped 
by national governments operating in specific institutional settings, in particular the joint-
decision trap that is characteristic of cooperative federalism systems and territorial interests. 
 
Voluntary, sectoral cooperation by member states also in other arenas 
As indicated above, healthcare provided by parties other than the member states under the 
direct aegis of the EU is barely an option. However, even without an explicit treaty basis for 
legislating how to directly organise, finance, and provide healthcare, European healthcare 
integration could yet take root through voluntary sectoral policy cooperation (Obinger et al. 
2005b: 567). As a relatively inexpensive means of increasing EU involvement, the European 
Commission provides the infrastructure for voluntary cooperation among member states and 
non-state actors such as health professionals and patient organisations. Through a variety of 
soft governance arrangements, such as informal committees, reflection processes, conferences, 
public consultations, health forums and joint actions, the discursive standardisation and further 
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acceptance of EU involvement in healthcare can grow (Fierlbeck 2014). Meanwhile, studies that 
focus on healthcare systems are increasingly being funded by the EU Framework Programmes 
for Research (Legido Quigley et al. 2008). Through voluntary cooperation, the European 
Commission can thus set and keep healthcare policies on the European agenda. International 
comparison and mutual learning entail a certain measure of healthcare norm standardisation 
regarding issues such as quality of care and e-health applications for cross-border information 
exchange (Vollaard et al. 2013). Cooperation in other international organisations with 
overlapping membership is instrumental in this respect. For instance, the European Commission 
has made the healthcare quality indicators project of the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) a matter of priority in its public health policies. 
Voluntary cooperation regarding safety and quality standards within the EU also relies on work 
of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the World Health Organisation-Europe (WHO).  
EU legislative initiatives in healthcare may yet encounter intractable resistance from 
national governments in formal arenas such as the Council, but cooperation among policy 
experts in the health sector could overcome the joint-decision trap (Peters 1997). In the end, 
member states are not unitary actors. Moreover, member states might not want EU healthcare 
policy covered by hard law, but they might see advantages in participating in soft governance 
arrangements. For example, since the 1990s, EU ministers who are responsible for social 
protection have exchanged ideas about how to counteract pressures from the internal market 
and to meet the social policy objectives in the non-binding arrangements that were later called 
the Open Method of Coordination (Fierlbeck [2014]; Greer and Vanhercke [2010]; Princen 
[2009]). Furthermore, informal meetings allowed national high-level civil servants to discuss the 
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sensitive issue of cross-border healthcare and related issues in response to the CJEU verdicts 
(Hervey and Vanhercke 2010). Meanwhile, ministers not only of social and health affairs but 
also of finance and economic affairs sought opportunities to learn how to maintain the financial 
sustainability of healthcare systems in the face of changes such as demanding citizens, an 
ageing population, and technological advancements. These changes raise questions such as 
how to keep high-quality care accessible for everyone, how to enhance social inclusion through 
health-improving policies, and how to foster the growth potential of the medical sector (Greer 
and Vanhercke 2010). Although national governments have continued to emphasise their 
responsibilities regarding organising and financing their healthcare systems, the various 
directorates-general of the European Commission could thus offer platforms to diffuse policy 
ideas, which could limit the diversity of healthcare systems. This also prepares—in combination 
with the standardisation of healthcare norms from arenas within and outside of the EU—the 
ground for more binding EU interference. 
First, elaborating on ‘soft’ charters, declarations, conventions and recommendations by 
the EU, the CoE and WHO, the Lisbon Treaty enshrines patients’ rights with a reference to the 
binding Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, stating that “everyone has the right of access 
to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions 
established by national laws and practices”. In addition, informal platforms for discussing the 
impact of CJEU case law on healthcare systems eventually generated acceptance among the 
member states and other healthcare actors in order to limit legal uncertainty by adopting a 
directive on how to apply patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare.  
25 
 
 
Member states’ fiscal stress 
Comparative federalism literature suggests fiscal stress at the member state level as a factor 
that allows for increasing influence of the central authorities (Obinger et al. 2005a: 45). 
Financial dependence offers the opportunity for central authorities to provide financial support 
in exchange for a say in certain policy matters. For example, in Canada, labour mobility and 
demographic differences between the provinces resulted in fiscal imbalances in the provinces’ 
social security systems beginning in the 1930s (Banting 1995, 2005). Leaving the classic model 
of dual federalism behind, the Canadian provincial and federal authorities subsequently shifted 
towards shared-cost federalism, albeit less so since the late 1990s. The EU has also become 
more closely involved with national healthcare systems when countries face fiscal stress. 
Candidate member states have received financial support and recommendations to undo their 
social-economic weaknesses by strengthening their health infrastructures. EU structural funds 
include financial support for healthcare-related issues in economically weak regions, even 
though the organisation of healthcare systems itself was excluded until recently (Hervey and 
Vanhercke 2010: 91). Guidelines with respect to healthcare to coordinate public budgets within 
the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact encompassed within the Economic and 
Monetary Union were rather general and non-binding (Baeten and Thomson 2012). The debt 
crises resulted in a major change in this respect. The adjustment programmes for debt-struck 
countries, such as Greece, Portugal and Cyprus, included specific prescriptions for controlling 
their healthcare budgets in exchange for financial assistance, following policy solutions that had 
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been discussed in voluntary schemes before (Baeten and Thomson [2012]; Fahy [2012]; 
Fierlbeck, [2014]; Greer [2014]). In a European semester, combining a reinforced Stability and 
Growth Pact and closer economic policy coordination to meet the targets of the Europe 2020 
growth strategy, the EU has obtained a more stringent role in supervising national budgets and 
the economic growth potential of the Eurozone member states. The European semester, 
beginning with the Annual Growth Survey of European Commission—which outlined the 
economic priorities—also includes increasingly detailed recommendations on financing and 
organising healthcare. If Eurozone members fail to contain their budget deficits and public 
debts, warnings and sanctions may follow (Baeten and Thomson 2012). The predominant 
economic and financial nature of the European Semester provoked health and social actors 
within member states and the European Commission to address healthcare more specifically 
(see, e.g., European Commission 2013). This growing EU involvement with national healthcare 
systems has already been qualified as a “competence grab” and “the biggest power shift since 
the single market was set up” (Keating 2013). Even without a large budget or a self-contained 
tax base, the EU could more easily interfere in healthcare policies because of the increasingly 
dependent role of member states in times of fiscal stress. 
 
THE NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN HEALTHCARE UNION IN THE MAKING 
Even though healthcare can be considered a least likely case of European integration 
(Martinsen 2005), the EU has increasingly become involved in the matter. A European 
healthcare union is in the making. Healthcare is now produced, consumed and provided across 
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the internal borders of the EU (common use), multiple common values and standards have 
been agreed upon, common institutions that are directly related to health have been 
established, and common regulations (Coordination Regulations; patients’ rights directive) 
based on the specific subset of EU health laws (Hervey and McHale 2015) and some manner of 
common financing (in countries with fiscal stress) now occur. Certainly, national healthcare 
systems have not been fully integrated into a single European healthcare system, but the EU 
has become an extra, albeit thin, layer in organising, financing and providing healthcare. 
Although a European healthcare union initially seemed unlikely from a federalist perspective, 
this same perspective helped us to understand how it could have eventually emerged 
nevertheless. The specific institutional settings in the EU, such as the interpretative role of the 
CJEU, the Commission’s right of initiative, and the joint-decision trap, have shaped the 
trajectory of the European healthcare union. Although the member states have not been able 
to fully roll back the EU’s influence, the cooperative federal dynamic has allowed territorial 
politics to be voiced in decision-making, making it possible to modify the impact of CJEU case 
law and allow for more territorial control of patient flows than was originally envisioned by the 
European Commission. Instead of exclusively focusing on national governments and their 
preferences or on supranational actors and spill-over effects, federalist theory has thus shown 
its explanatory value in enabling a more comprehensive analysis of the dynamics of allocating 
healthcare tasks, in which both national governments and supranational actors can and do play 
an active role within the specific institutional settings of the EU. The European healthcare union 
is a combination of regulatory and voluntary arrangements. Starting from a condition of dual 
federalism, it has become a cooperative federative system that combines self-rule (a large part 
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of healthcare is still organised by member states) and shared rule (mainly concerning the 
collective coordination of cross-border healthcare and the market of health goods, services, 
persons and capital). It is important to note that the mechanisms may be comparable with 
those of other federal systems, but their actual contents are not. For example, the EU does not 
run programmes to pay health professionals for their services or provide patients with 
subsidised prescribed drugs, as in Australia, and it does not provide federal grants to member 
states’ healthcare systems to the extent Canada and the USA do. Its limited financial means 
deny the EU the opportunity to equalise differences in quality of and access to healthcare 
within the EU. It thus remains an instance of cooperative federalism in the foreseeable future. 
The imperative question, however, is whether this combination of self-rule and shared 
rule will hold. The robustness of federal systems depends on 1) structural, electoral and judicial 
safeguards that guarantee the division of rule and 2) the ‘glue’ provided by political parties 
operating across various levels of government and a popular federal culture (Bednar 2009). The 
division of rule in the area of healthcare is enshrined in the treaties, which can only be modified 
by elected parliaments. This structural division is, however, not safe from CJEU case law, which 
raised considerable protest from member states in the past. Nevertheless, the opportunity for 
states’ governments to voice their protests within the EU could have prevented them from 
opting for a (partial) exit from the EU instead. The European healthcare union is still frail in 
terms of its party-political and popular safeguards; most political parties prefer to keep EU 
involvement in healthcare at bay. In other multilevel polities, healthcare policies have been an 
important instrument for fostering a common culture and strengthening political legitimacy. 
For example, in the case of Canada, financial transfers from federal authorities to states have 
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enhanced the sense of belonging within the federal community and the legitimacy of the 
federal authorities (Banting 1995, 2005). It is thus no surprise that the province of Quebec has 
initiated welfare arrangements to strengthen the provincial community instead. The EU has 
also perceived initiatives for cross-border healthcare as a means of giving EU citizenship more 
substance. For instance, the decision to introduce the European Health Insurance Card was 
celebrated by the European Parliament and the European Commission as an important step for 
European citizenship; the then president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, proudly 
presented the card as an important contribution to European identity (Vollaard 2006). 
Furthermore, after the CJEU underlined citizens’ rights to obtain healthcare abroad and to be 
reimbursed for said care, the European Commission gradually began to describe patient 
mobility in its communications and documents no longer as a side effect of the internal market 
but as a right of European citizens. Additionally, after the French and Dutch voted no against 
the European Constitutional Treaty in the spring of 2005, the European Commission justified a 
renewed initiative regarding health services in 2007 on the basis of its “Citizens’ Agenda” to 
enhance the legitimacy of the European Union. Healthcare is thus used as an instrument to 
foster a European sense of belonging among the citizens of the EU member states—the 
question, however, is to what effect. 
In the EU, the initial division of rule caused market-making policies to precede market-
corrected and health-oriented policies. This sequence of developments has left its mark on the 
EU’s healthcare policies. Growing EU involvement has often been a by-product of expanding 
the free movement of goods, services, and labour in the internal market and has therefore 
been rather a commodifying power, even if the CJEU has increasingly taken into account 
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governments’ concerns about the financial viability and solidarity of healthcare systems 
(Hatzopolous and Hervey 2013). Commodification means individualising choice options, in 
contrast with a system of collective solidarity in which poor and rich, sick and fit, old and young 
share health risks. Moreover, a greater supply of healthcare outside of the national territory 
can be more easily obtained by younger, higher educated, high income citizens who seek 
elective care than by older, chronic patients with limited means and language capacities. 
Individualisation is also emphasised by the focus on the rights of individual patients in the 
recent patients’ rights directive. This individualised nature of the European healthcare union 
does not foster ’we-ness’, a mutual sense of belonging together, and the limited we-ness is 
recently reflected in the calls in England and Germany to limit access to healthcare for workers 
from Bulgaria and Romania. The caps on healthcare funding that were demanded in the 
economic adjustment programmes for countries such as Greece and Portugal or healthcare 
reforms that were recommended in the European semester will not generate warm feelings 
towards the EU either, particularly when national governments use the EU itself as a scapegoat. 
In sum, the European healthcare union does not appear in practice to be instrumental in 
strengthening the EU’s legitimacy and mutual sense of belonging. With such a weak popular 
safeguard, the European healthcare union is still not robust.  
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